The Supreme Court of Canada: Policy-Maker of the Year by Perrin, Benjamin
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
11-2014
The Supreme Court of Canada: Policy-Maker of
the Year
Benjamin Perrin
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, perrin@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Courts Commons
This Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
Benjamin Perrin, "The Supreme Court of Canada: Policy-Maker of the Year" (Ottawa: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, November 2014).
 Electronic copy available at: 533524 
A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication
The Supreme  
Court of Canada:  
Policy-Maker of  
the Year 
Benjamin Perrin
NOVEMBER 2014
 Electronic copy available at: 533524 
Board of Directors
Chair  
rob Wildeboer 
Executive Chairman, Martinrea International Inc., 
Vaughan
ViCe Chair 
Jacquelyn Thayer Scott 
Past President and Professor,  
Cape Breton University, Sydney
Managing DireCTor  
Brian Lee Crowley 
Former Clifford Clark Visiting Economist  
at Finance Canada
SeCreTary 
Lincoln Caylor 
Partner, Bennett Jones LLP, Toronto
TreaSurer 
Martin MacKinnon 
Co-Founder & Chief Financial Officer,  
b4checkin, Halifax
DireCTorS
John M. Beck 
Executive Chairman, Aecon Group Inc., Toronto
Pierre Casgrain  
Director and Corporate Secretary of Casgrain  
& Company Limited, Montreal
erin Chutter 
President and CEO of Global Cobalt Corp.,  
Vancouver 
navjeet (Bob) Dhillon 
President and CEO, Mainstreet Equity Corp.,  
Calgary 
Wayne gudbranson 
CEO, Branham Group Inc., Ottawa
Stanley hartt 
Counsel, Norton Rose Fulbright, Toronto
Peter John nicholson 
Former President, Canadian Council of Academies, 
Ottawa
advisory Council
Jim Dinning 
Former Treasurer of Alberta
Don Drummond 
Economics Advisor to the TD Bank, Matthews Fellow 
in Global Policy and Distinguished Visiting Scholar at 
the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University
Brian Flemming 
International lawyer, writer and policy advisor
robert Fulford 
Former editor of Saturday Night magazine,  
columnist with the National Post, Toronto
Calvin helin 
Aboriginal author and entrepreneur, Vancouver
hon. Jim Peterson 
Former federal cabinet minister, Counsel at  
Fasken Martineau, Toronto
Maurice B. Tobin 
The Tobin Foundation, Washington DC
research advisory Board
Janet ajzenstat 
Professor Emeritus of Politics, McMaster University
Brian Ferguson 
Professor, health care economics, University of 
Guelph
Jack granatstein 
Historian and former head of the Canadian  
War Museum
Patrick James 
Professor, University of Southern California
rainer Knopff 
Professor of Politics, University of Calgary
Larry Martin 
George Morris Centre, University of Guelph
Christopher Sands 
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington DC
William Watson 
Associate Professor of Economics, McGill University
True North in Canadian Public Policy
For more information visit: www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca
C
ov
er
: C
an
ad
ia
n
 S
u
p
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 a
t 
N
ig
h
t 
©
C
h
ri
st
op
h
eL
ed
en
t/
T
h
in
ks
to
ck
. G
av
el
/F
la
g 
©
Er
ic
sP
h
ot
og
ra
p
h
y/
iS
to
ck
p
h
ot
o.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................. 2
Sommaire ................................................................................................. 3
1. Introduction ......................................................................................... 4
2. Current Members of the Supreme Court of Canada............................ 5
3. Discussion & Analysis  .......................................................................... 6
4. Review of Major Judgments  .............................................................. 12
5. Conclusion.......................................................................................... 29
Biography ............................................................................................... 30
References .............................................................................................. 31
Endnotes ................................................................................................ 33
The authors of this document have worked independently and are solely responsible for the views presented here.  
The opinions are not necessarily those of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, its directors or supporters. 
2 Benjamin Perrin
Executive Summary
Each year, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy recognizes a “Policy-Maker of 
the Year”. Past recipients have included former Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney and 
Foreign Minister John Baird, who have had a tremendous impact on our country’s economic 
stability and international stature, respectively.
One could argue that, while people in such positions are undoubtedly influential, there is 
another entity that is rarely acknowledged for its influence on policy, but in the last year has 
changed Canadian public policy in wide-reaching and long-lasting ways – the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC). This paper examines the Court’s 10 most significant judgments of the last 
12 months in terms of their importance and policy implications, on issues ranging from the 
Senate reform reference to the Bedford case challenging Canada’s prostitution laws to the 
Tsilhqot’in Aboriginal land claim in BC.
This analysis comes at a time when media commentators have characterized recent high 
court decisions as a string of “losses” for the federal government. So what does the evidence 
show?
•	 The policy and legal impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions of the 
last year are significant and likely enduring;
•	 the Supreme Court of Canada was a remarkably united institution with 
consensus decisions on these significant cases being the norm, and dissenting 
opinions rare; and
•	 the federal government indeed has an abysmal record of losses on significant 
cases, with a clear win in just one in 10 of them.
In the last year, the Court has effectively taken Senate reform off the federal agenda for 
the foreseeable future, torpedoing both the governing Conservatives’ reform program and 
the Opposition New Democrats’ policy to abolish the Senate. The Court has struck down 
much of Canada’s prostitution legislation, resulting in a dramatic rewriting of the law by the 
current government. It has changed the landscape in parts of Canada for Aboriginal rights, 
affected tools available for fighting crime and terrorism, and cast into question how future 
appointments to the Court from Quebec will be managed. One would be hard-pressed to find 
another actor in Canada who has had a greater impact on such a wide range of issues than the 
Court has in the last year, such that the moniker Policy-Maker of the Year is appropriate. The 
Court, no doubt, would resist such a label on the view that it simply applies the law as part of 
its constitutional mandate. But the policy impact of its recent decisions is clear.
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Sommaire
Chaque année, l’Institut de politiques publiques Macdonald-Laurier désigne le « Décideur de l’an-
née ». Parmi les précédents élus figurent le précédent gouverneur de la Banque du Canada, Mark 
Carney, et le ministre des Affaires étrangères, John Baird, qui ont tous deux joué un rôle exceptionnel, 
le premier sur le maintien de la stabilité économique au pays et le deuxième sur notre renommée 
internationale.
Si les personnes occupant de telles positions exercent un pouvoir incontestable, on peut néanmoins 
avancer qu’une entité rarement reconnue pour son influence sur la politique publique canadienne a 
réellement influé sur elle de façon étendue et durable l’an dernier : il s’agit de la Cour suprême du Ca-
nada. Cette étude examine la portée et les conséquences sur la politique publique des dix arrêts les 
plus importants de la Cour suprême depuis 12 mois sur des questions allant de la réforme du Sénat à 
la contestation des lois canadiennes sur la prostitution dans l’affaire Bedford, en passant par la recon-
naissance du titre ancestral revendiqué par la Première Nation Tsilhqot’in en Colombie-Britannique.
Cette analyse arrive à un moment où les chroniqueurs caractérisent les décisions de la Haute Cour 
comme une série ininterrompue d’« échecs » pour le gouvernement fédéral. Que démontrent les faits 
en réalité?
•	 Les incidences dans les domaines politique et juridique des décisions de la Cour su-
prême l’an dernier sont importantes et vraisemblablement durables;
•	 La Cour suprême du Canada est une institution remarquablement unie au sein de la-
quelle les décisions prises de manière consensuelle sur des dossiers importants sont 
la norme et les opinions dissidentes sont rares; et
•	 Le gouvernement fédéral présente en effet un bilan catastrophique, ayant subi un 
revers dans pratiquement toutes les causes importantes et n’ayant remporté une 
victoire sûre que pour seulement l’une des dix.
Au cours de la dernière année, la Cour a effectivement reporté sine die la réforme du Sénat qui était 
à l’ordre du jour et torpillé avec une grande efficacité à la fois le programme de réforme du Sénat du 
gouvernement conservateur et l’engagement de l’opposition néo-démocrate visant à l’abolir. La Cour 
a invalidé une grande partie de la législation sur la prostitution au Canada, ce qui oblige le gouver-
nement actuel à réécrire la loi. Elle a changé complètement la donne en ce qui concerne les droits 
des Autochtones dans certaines régions du Canada, s’est prononcée sur les méthodes utilisées pour 
combattre le crime et le terrorisme et a remis en question la façon dont les futures nominations à la 
Cour du Québec seront effectuées. On aurait bien du mal à trouver un autre acteur au Canada qui a 
eu un impact plus important sur un tel éventail de questions cette dernière année. Notre « Décideur 
de l’année » est donc bien choisi. La Cour suprême, sans doute, résisterait à porter une telle étiquette 
en faisant valoir qu’elle ne fait qu’appliquer la loi dans le cadre de son mandat constitutionnel. Mais 
l’impact sur la politique de ses décisions récentes est indiscutable.
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1. Introduction
Are the Supreme Court of Canada and Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government on a collision 
course? During the last year, the Supreme Court of Canada has made a series of landmark decisions 
in areas including Senate reform, Aboriginal title and treaty rights, prostitution laws, the appointment 
of justices to the Court from Quebec, security certificates and protection of Canadian Security In-
telligence Service (CSIS) human sources, undercover police operations, and sentencing. During this 
period, numerous commentators have characterized the decisions of the Court as reflecting a string 
of “losses” for Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government. Some have gone so far as to say that Can-
ada has entered a “legal cold war” and that these “[l]egal conflicts reveal a clash of beliefs about how 
Canada should work” (Ling 7 August 2014). 
Within this context and while appreciating that the work of the 
Court is cyclical and outcomes vary from year to year, this pa-
per explores the recent track record of the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the significance of some of its landmark decisions 
from the last year. Part 2 of this paper introduces the current 
members of the Court. Part 3 discusses the main findings from 
this study, focusing on trends across the top 10 most significant 
public law judgments from the last year. Part 4 provides an in-
depth examination of each of these decisions, including their 
impact on public policy.1 The main findings of this study are:
1. The policy and legal impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions of the last year are 
significant and likely enduring;
2. the Supreme Court of Canada was a remarkably united institution with consensus decisions 
on these significant cases being the norm, and dissenting opinions rare; and
3. the federal government has an abysmal record of losses on significant cases, with a clear win 
in just one in 10 of them.
Numerous 
commentators have 
characterized the 
decisions of the Court  
as a string of “losses”  
for the government. 
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2. Current Members of the Supreme 
Court of Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada is comprised of the members listed in table 1, organized in order of 
seniority. Members of the Court are entitled to serve until reaching the mandatory retirement age of 
75 years (Supreme Court Act).
To date, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has appointed six of the nine judges of the Court and will be 
able to appoint a seventh judge after November 30, 2014 when Justice Louis LeBel reaches the age of 
mandatory retirement. Several of the judges appointed by Prime Minister Harper could serve until at 
least 2030, based on their mandatory retirement age. 
Table 1: Current members of the Supreme Court of Canada
name of Justice
year of  
appoint-
ment appointed by
Mandatory 
retirement 
year
The Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin,  
Chief Justice 
1989 (Justice)
2000 (Chief 
Justice)
The Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney  
(as Justice)
The Rt. Hon. Jean Chrétien  
(as Chief Justice)
2018
The Hon. Mr. Justice Louis LeBel 2000 The Rt. Hon. Jean Chrétien 2014
The Hon. Madam Justice Rosalie  
Silberman Abella
2004 The Rt. Hon. Paul Martin 2021
The Hon. Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein 2006 The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper 2015
The Hon. Mr. Justice Thomas Albert 
Cromwell
2008 The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper 2027
The Hon. Mr. Justice Michael J. Moldaver 2011 The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper 2022
The Hon. Madam Justice Andromache 
Karakatsanis
2011 The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper 2030
The Hon. Mr. Justice Richard Wagner 2012 The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper 2032
The Hon. Mr. Justice Clément Gascon 2014 The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper 2035
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3. Discussion & Analysis 
This project originated with the idea of providing a “year-in-review” of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decisions, spurred by media commentary related to a number of high-profile and 
controversial cases that began with the Court’s decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Bedford, related to the constitutionality of Canada’s prostitution laws. The one-year period 
selected for review was November 1, 2013 to October 31, 2014. The goal of the study was to 
determine whether it has indeed been an extraordinary 12-month period for the Court, rec-
ognizing that its work and outcomes are likely cyclical over the long-term.
All judgments of the Court during this period were considered for inclusion in the analysis 
that follows. The top 10 cases were selected to provide a manageable, but meaningful number 
of cases to analyse and compare. These cases were selected based on the importance of their 
subject matter and broad significance to Canadians. The outcome of the decisions was not a 
consideration in selecting them. In the end, there were few additional cases that were of the 
same magnitude of importance as these decisions, so the contest around which to select as 
the top 10 was not particularly difficult. It is observable that the selection criteria led to a 
focus on public law cases, across a wide spectrum of areas of law, including constitutional 
law, Aboriginal law, criminal law (encompassing substantive criminal law, criminal procedure 
and evidence, and sentencing), and immigration/national security law. However, some of these 
decisions have significant implications for private actors, including individuals and private 
corporations. 
Table 2, below, provides a snapshot of these decisions and their outcomes. Each case is iden-
tified by its style of cause and citation with a brief note on its subject matter. The outcome in 
the case is listed, according to whether it was a unanimous decision, majority decision with 
concurring reasons, or a case involving majority reasons with dissenting reasons. The final 
column of “Government Win or Loss” (which refers to the federal government) requires some 
explanation, since the federal government is not a party to every case reaching the Court. The 
determination of whether a case involved a “win” or “loss” for the federal government refers to 
cases where the Court either agreed with, or rejected, respectively, the position taken by the 
federal government (which includes the Attorney General of Canada, Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration, and Director of Public Prosecutions in these cases). In some instances, these 
federal entities were parties to the proceeding, whereas they were interveners in others. 
They are listed generally in terms of greatest to least significance in terms of long-term public 
policy impact for illustrative purposes only – such a ranking is not the aim of this study and 
reasonable people will undoubtedly rank some cases higher or lower than others. It appears, 
however, to be more meaningful than a mere chronological listing of cases.
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Table 2: Top 10 Supreme Court of Canada decisions of the last year
Case Citation Subject Unanimous
Majority and 
Concurring 
Reasons
Dissenting 
Reasons
Government 
Win or Loss
Reference re  
Senate Reform
2014 SCC 
32
Senate reform The Court Loss
Tsilhqot’in Na-
tion v. British 
Columbia
2014 SCC 
44
Aboriginal title 
and land claims
McLachlin C.J. Loss 
Grassy Narrows 
First Nation v. 
Ontario  
(Natural 
Resources)
2014 SCC 
48
Aboriginal 
treaty rights
McLachlin C.J. Win
Canada  
(Attorney Gener-
al) v. Bedford
2013 SCC 
72
Prostitution McLachlin C.J. Loss
Reference re  
Supreme Court 
Act, ss. 5 and 6
2014 SCC 
21
Appointment 
of Supreme 
Court of Can-
ada Justices 
from Quebec
McLachlin 
C.J. and 
LeBel, Abella, 
Cromwell, 
Karakatsanis, 
and Wagner JJ.
Moldaver J. Loss
Canada  
(Citizenship and 
Immigration)  
v. Harkat
2014 SCC 
37
Terrorism – 
security  
certificates and 
CSIS human 
sources
McLachlin C.J. 
Abella and 
Cromwell JJ.
Mixed
R. v. Hart
2014 SCC 
52
“Mr. Big”  
police 
operations
Moldaver J. 
(majority); 
Cromwell,
Karakatsanis JJ. 
(concur)
Mixed2
R. v. Spencer
2014 SCC 
43
Cybercrime – 
request by  
police for basic 
subscriber  
information  
from ISPs
Cromwell J. Loss
R. v. Summers
2014 SCC 
26
Truth in  
Sentencing Act
Karakatsanis J. Loss
Canada  
(Attorney Gener-
al) v. Whaling
2014 SCC 
20
Retrospective  
repeal of accel-
erated parole 
review
Wagner J. Loss
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Based on the analysis in Part 4 of this paper, which examines each of these decisions in-depth, three 
primary findings were made. 
3.1 The policy and legal impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions of the last 
year are significant and likely enduring
In its decisions on significant constitutional matters in the last year, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
made bold decisions that fundamentally affect the way that Canadian democracy functions, the rela-
tionship between the Crown and First Nations (including involving resource development), limits on 
police investigative tactics, and decisions on controversial criminal law issues. It appears that the last 
year has likely had a disproportionate number of landmark cases of broad significance and interest 
to Canadians. 
The most significant and enduring impact of the Supreme Court of Canada in the last year will be its 
interpretation of the amending procedures in the Constitution Act, 1982 in its reference decisions 
related to Senate reform and the appointment of judges to the high court from Quebec. Taken togeth-
er, these decisions entrench the Senate and Supreme Court of Canada as institutions that are virtually 
untouchable. Changing the composition of either institution has been determined to require the 
unanimous approval of the House of Commons and the Senate as well as every provincial legislature. 
The Aboriginal law decisions of the Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia and Grassy Nar-
rows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources) are landmark decisions that, together, demonstrate 
that the constitutional authority that the provinces have over resource development generally ap-
plies even in dealings with First Nations. In particular, “provinces may now clearly regulate and make 
decisions relating to natural resources, even when Aboriginal rights and title questions are involved” 
(Coates and Newman 2014, 20). However, provincial governments are obliged to respect Aboriginal 
title and treaty rights, as the case may be, in these interactions with First Nations. These recent author-
ities from the Court will undoubtedly be at the top-of-mind of provincial governments and private 
corporations that are seeking approval and implementation of large-scale natural resource projects 
now and in the decades to come. 
Criminal law has always been a major part of the Court’s docket. The decision in Bedford is notable, 
not only on the issue of how prostitution may be addressed through the criminal law, but also because 
of the broader principles established in the decision with respect to the scope of section 7 of the 
Charter and its relationship with section 1 of the Charter. Specifically, the Court held that section 7 
is breached if the law is grossly disproportionate, overbroad, or has arbitrary effects “on one person” 
(Bedford (SCC), para. 123). As I have noted in a previous MLI Com-
mentary,3 this leaves no room for any balancing of broader socie-
tal interests or even broader individual interests. It puts section 7 
arguably on a hairpin trigger in the criminal law context. I think it 
is not coincidental then, that Bedford appears to suggest that the 
conventional wisdom that a section 7 infringement will almost nev-
er be justified under section 1 is perhaps not so ironclad. The Chief 
Justice noted that there are “crucial differences between the two 
sections” (Bedford (SCC), para. 124), that they “ask different ques-
tions” (Bedford (SCC), para. 125), “work in different ways” (Bedford 
(SCC), para. 126), and are “analytically distinct” (Bedford (SCC), para. 128). However, she added that 
it will be “unlikely” that a law that violates section 7 will be justified under section 1 (Bedford (SCC), 
para. 129). Bedford shifts the ground more broadly on when criminal laws will be found to infringe 
section 7, and creates a possibility of a successful section 1 justification argument by the government 
The last year 
has likely had a 
disproportionate 
number of 
landmark cases.
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in appropriate cases. The next chapter of this saga will undoubtedly be a new Charter challenge to 
Bill C-36 (the legislative response to Bedford) that advocates for legalized/decriminalized prostitution 
have threatened.
The Court has upheld the availability of some national security and policing tools, including the secu-
rity certificate regime and the Mr. Big technique, while imposing safeguards to ensure their constitu-
tionality and appropriate use, respectively, but has ruled against others such as protecting the identity 
of CSIS human sources and enabling police to obtain ISP subscriber information voluntarily from tele-
com companies. In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, while the security certificate 
regime was upheld, the majority failed to protect CSIS human sources through class privilege that 
applies to police informants. This troubling aspect of its decision was roundly criticized by the dis-
senting judges in that case and will likely be overruled through legislation, which the majority recog-
nized would be open to Parliament to do. In the cases of R. v. Hart and R. v. Mack, taken together, the 
Court developed the common law to maintain the availability of what can be a critical investigative 
technique (“Mr. Big”), but with adequate safeguards to prevent wrongful convictions. The application 
by the Court of its new framework to evaluate the admissibility of statements by accused persons in 
Mr. Big operations is coherent, reasonable, and provides necessary guidance to the police on whether 
and how to conduct such operations. In R. v. Spencer, we see the Court reining in the voluntary provi-
sion of basic subscriber information by ISPs to the police. The requirement for a legal basis to obtain 
such information will change police practices and increase their workloads, but ultimately protect 
the privacy of Canadians generally in the process. A potential showdown at the Court over certain 
provisions of Bill C-13, which is before Parliament is very likely, given the outcome in Spencer.
The Court also made modest decisions related to recent sentencing law reforms introduced by Prime 
Minister Harper’s government. The much more significant challenges to his criminal justice reforms 
have yet to be decided by the Court, in particular the constitutionality of a raft of new mandatory 
minimum penalties of imprisonment. In its decisions in R. v. Summers, the Court demonstrated that it 
will require clear proof of legislative intent to change traditional sentencing practices when interpret-
ing restrictive reforms. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, the Court also sent a clear message 
that retrospective sentencing reforms will not be tolerated as they run afoul of the Charter. 
3.2 The Supreme Court of Canada was a remarkably united institution with consensus 
decisions on these significant cases being the norm, and dissenting opinions rare
The Court’s record on significant cases in the last year reveals a remarkably united institution, with 
unanimous decisions on most controversial cases that have come before it. Of the 10 significant de-
cisions reviewed, only two had dissenting reasons. In other words, in eight of the 10 decisions, there 
was consensus on the outcome of the case (an 80 percent consensus rate). This rate of consensus 
stands out from recent years and is especially interesting given that it relates to the most significant 
decisions from the period under review.
Chart 1 identifies the 10-year trend in consensus decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada, with 
“unanimous” referring to consensus decisions where all judges agreed on the outcome, and “split 
decisions” referring to cases involving at least one dissenting opinion. These statistics provided by the 
Court reveal that it made consensus decisions in 68 percent of cases in 2013, 72 percent of cases in 
2012, and 75 percent of cases in 2011. This compares with an 80 percent consensus rate in the top 
10 most significant cases under review in this report. The Court has only achieved such a high rate 
of consensus in one previous year during the 2003 to 2013 period: in 2006, it also had an 80 percent 
consensus figure.
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Chart 1: Supreme Court of Canada degree of consensus, 2003–2013
The appeals to which the judgments relate may have been heard in a previous year.
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
*All Judges agreed in the disposition of the appeal.
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
Ju
d
gm
en
ts
Split
Unanimous*
19
62
21
57
24
65
16
63
22
36
18
56
26
44
17
52
18
53
23
60
25
53
Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2014, “Statistics 2003 to 2013 – Category 4: Appeal Judgments.”
This study also found that Chief Justice McLachlin is showing lead-
ership on major cases. Of these 10 decisions, the Chief Justice was 
the sole author of reasons in four of the 10 cases and was a joint 
author of two additional decisions. In all of these decisions, she was 
writing for either a unanimous Court or a majority of the judges. She 
did not dissent in a single significant case under review. The Chief 
Justice’s departure from the Court in 2018 due to mandatory retire-
ment, and the selection of a new Chief Justice at that time, will be a 
major transition for the Court as they lose this influential and highly 
productive Chief Justice who has a reputation in the legal communi-
ty for favouring consensus on major issues facing the Court. 
Due to the substantial unanimity of the Court’s major decisions, there is no evidence whatsoever of 
any deep fissures within the Court along ideological lines. This is in stark contrast to previous decades 
at the Court and has often been the case at the US Supreme Court. Related to this observation, there is 
no evidence whatsoever of any observable split in the Court’s decisions on significant issues between 
the six judges appointed by Prime Minister Harper and the three judges appointed by previous prime 
ministers (see tables 1 and 2 above). While judges are required to be independent and impartial, it is 
In contrast to 
previous decades, 
there is no evidence 
of fissures within 
the Court along 
ideological lines.
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nonetheless quite interesting that no observable ideological or philosophical trend is detectable be-
tween judges appointed by the current prime minister versus those appointed under previous prime 
ministers. In other words, the Court is certainly not “Harper’s Court” as some had speculated it could 
become after so many appointments.  
3.3 The federal government has an abysmal record of losses on significant cases in the 
last year, with a clear win in just one in 10 of them
Media commentary on the Court’s decisions raising the spectre of a string of losses for the federal 
government at the Supreme Court of Canada was validated by this study. Of the 10 significant deci-
sions, the federal government won just a single case, while achieving mixed results in two cases. By 
way of providing some context, on average, 41 percent of Charter claimants have historically been 
successful in the Court – meaning that the various levels of government succeeded in 59 percent of 
such cases on average (Monahan and Sethi 2012, 2). 
However, it bears mention that the abysmal record of recent losses for the federal government does 
not mean that all of these losses are attributable to legislation or recent action of the current federal 
government led by Prime Minister Harper. For example, some cases relate to government action orig-
inating decades ago, by other levels of government (for instance in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Co-
lumbia, the case was triggered by a commercial logging licence issued by BC in 1983 – nevertheless, 
the current federal government sided with BC and it lost). As noted above, while the Court’s record is 
likely to be cyclical over a longer period of time, it is nevertheless noteworthy that this past year saw 
the federal government off-side many unanimous decisions of the Court. 
What should the federal government do going forward? A post-mortem of these cases, as a whole, 
should be conducted within the federal government to determine the factors that may have con-
tributed to the losses. In particular, was the legal advice received by the government reasonable or 
did it turn out to be significantly off the mark in terms of the actual outcome in the case? Did the 
instructions provided by the relevant decision-maker related to the positions to take in the case 
differ significantly from the legal advice received by officials? For example, in a given case, did the 
legal advice indicate that a given position was strong, and this advice was followed – or did the legal 
advice say the position was weak, yet the instructions were to proceed anyway? Additionally, could 
the federal government have been more proactive in these cases, within the bounds of what is appro-
priate? For instance, could they have done a better job of marshalling evidence, conducting outreach 
to potentially friendly interveners in the case, and engaging with them in discussions related to it? 
Should some cases have included eminent external counsel, either as advisers or advocates? Should 
the federal government have intervened earlier in certain cases on issues that are central to its agenda, 
including at the trial level, to ensure a strong record for the inevitable appeals? In short, while there 
are a range of factors that contribute to a record of the type that the federal government has recently 
endured, a detailed internal review could expose systematic weaknesses with the federal govern-
ment’s litigation strategy that could be addressed for future cases. Until this is exhaustively done, it 
would be premature, as some commentators have suggested, to conclude that there is a fundamental 
rift in values between the federal government and the Court. 
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4. Review of Major Judgments 
Each of the major judgments of the Court, identified above, is summarized below along with its 
subject area, identification of the parties, and the judges who wrote reasons. After providing basic 
information about each case there is a synopsis of the Court’s decision (including concurring and 
dissenting opinions, as relevant), followed by a discussion of the implications of the decision moving 
forward in terms of their impact on the law, policy, and (in some cases) political considerations. 
4.1 Reference re Senate Reform (Senate reform)
Citation:  Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32
Date:   April 25, 2014
appellant:  N/A (Reference by the Governor in Council)
respondent: N/A
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and 
Wagner JJ.
issue: The Government of Canada referred a series of questions to the Court on the consti-
tutional authority of the federal government to reform or abolish the Senate (para. 5).
Decision: Unanimous decision by the Court: acting on its own, the federal government cannot 
meaningfully reform or abolish the Senate. 
Background: 
Since 2006, Prime Minister Harper’s government has introduced several proposed laws related to Sen-
ate reform, but none of them was adopted by Parliament.  Issues related to their constitutionality were 
regularly raised during debates and in the media. On February 1, 2013, the federal Cabinet decided 
to refer a broad set of questions to the Court about the authority of Parliament, acting on its own, to 
reform the Senate. It also asked about abolition, which the Official Opposition, the New Democratic 
Party, favoured. 
Synopsis:
The Court began this reference decision by noting the historically significant, but contested role of 
the Senate, stating: “The Senate is one of Canada’s foundational political institutions. It lies at the heart 
of the agreements that gave birth to the Canadian federation. Yet from its first sittings, voices have 
called for reform of the Senate and even, on occasion, for its outright abolition” (Reference re Senate 
Reform, para. 1).
The Court found that most of the contemplated changes to the Senate require “substantial federal-pro-
vincial consensus” (Reference re Senate Reform, para. 111) and could not be undertaken unilaterally 
by the federal government. Consultative elections for senators and imposing term-limits on them 
require the general amending formula be satisfied (at least seven provinces representing half of the 
population of all provinces must assent). Full repeal of the property requirement for senators requires 
the consent of Quebec due to special rules related to that province’s historical electoral divisions.  Ab-
olition of the Senate requires unanimous consent of the Senate, House of Commons, and all provinces.
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implications of the Decision:
The Court’s reference decision means that meaningful Senate reform cannot be achieved by Parlia-
ment alone and that proposed legislation such as Bill C-7, the Senate Reform Act; Bill S-4, Constitution 
Act, 2006 (Senate tenure); and Bill C-20, the Senate Appointment Consultations Act cannot create 
consultative elections for senators or limit their terms without provincial consent. Politically, the 
reference decision was thus a major embarrassment for the government, on the one hand, but it was 
fortunate that it was made prior to the adoption and implementation of any of this legislation. 
In effect, Reference re Senate Reform has taken Senate reform off of the federal legislative agenda. It 
has guaranteed that Senate reform or abolition can now only take place as part of a future round of 
constitutional amendment negotiations involving the federal and provincial governments (as with the 
ill-fated 1987 Meech Lake Accord and 1992 Charlottetown Accord).
Despite the significance of its decision, the Court attempted to strike a deferential tone going forward, 
in stating: “Our role is not to speculate on the full range of possible changes to the Senate. Rather, the 
proper role of this Court in the ongoing debate regarding the future of the Senate is to determine 
the legal framework for implementing the specific changes contemplated in the questions put to us. 
The desirability of these changes is not a question for the Court; it is an issue for Canadians and their 
legislatures” (Reference re Senate Reform, para. 4).
The future of the Senate has become a political quagmire for all of the major political parties, such 
that Senate reform is unlikely to feature in the platforms of any of the major parties in 2015 and, in-
stead, the appointment of senators and their party affiliations will become an increasingly complex 
and sensitive challenge to manage. Prime Minister Harper has to decide how to go about appointing 
senators without consultative elections, which his proposed legislation favoured. His declining to 
appoint new senators can last for a time – indeed his game-plan may very well be to “run out the 
clock” by not appointing any new senators during his term in office – even if that extends to another 
mandate in 2015. However, it would be better to develop policy options on how to appoint senators 
going forward and there should be a public debate about the merits of different models. 
The NDP Official Opposition is in the unenviable position of 
having its main Senate abolition policy declared by the Court as 
requiring the unanimous approval of the House of Commons, 
Senate, and all provinces – which is clearly unattainable today or 
in the foreseeable future, making the policy quixotic. There’s the 
more pressing issue for the NDP that if they form government 
one day, they will begin their mandate with zero senators. This 
would inevitably affect their ability to effectively govern and im-
plement their agenda, despite an electoral mandate to do so. 
Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau’s decision to jettison his party’s senators from party affairs, fund-
raising, and their Parliamentary caucus was also a significant – but not irreversible – decision. If it 
stands and his party forms government, then he would no doubt face some pressure to bring these 
senators back into the fold. However, even if he did not, it is highly likely the ousted Liberal Senators 
would simply shadow the party line in any event on most matters.
Reference re Senate 
Reform has taken 
Senate reform off of 
the federal legislative 
agenda.
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4.2 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia (aboriginal title and land claims)
Citation:  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44
Date:   June 26, 2014
appellant:  Roger William, on his own behalf, on behalf of all other members of the Xeni Gwet’in 
First Nations Government, and on behalf of all other members of the Tsilhqot’in Na-
tion
respondent: Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, Regional Manag-
er of the Cariboo Forest Region and Attorney General of Canada
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and 
Wagner JJ.
issue: Whether the Tsilhqot’in Nation has Aboriginal title over an area where British Colum-
bia granted a commercial logging licence. If so, did British Columbia breach its duty to 
consult? 
Decision: Unanimous decision by McLachlin C.J.: A declaration of Aboriginal title over the area 
was granted as well as a declaration that British Columbia breached its duty to consult 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation.
Synopsis:
The Tsilhqot’in Nation was a “semi-nomadic” group of six bands that historically lived in a remote 
valley in central British Columbia, and has an unresolved land claim. In 1983, the province granted a 
commercial logging licence in an area that the Tsilhqot’in Nation considered part of their traditional 
territory. The Tsilhqot’in Nation objected and amended their land claim to assert Aboriginal title in 
the area where logging had been approved. The claim was opposed by the federal and provincial 
governments. 
Aboriginal title encompasses “the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment 
and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the 
land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage the land” (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 
para. 73). The Court held that the Tsilhqot’in Nation had established Aboriginal title in the disputed 
area. Chief Justice McLachlin stated for a unanimous Court that occupation is not limited to settlement 
sites, but also includes tracts of land regularly used for hunting, fishing, or other resource exploitation 
at the time of assertion of European sovereignty, so long as the group exercised effective control. 
Once Aboriginal title is established, the Court held that “the Crown must seek the consent of the ti-
tle-holding Aboriginal group to developments on the land. Absent consent, development of title land 
cannot proceed unless the Crown has discharged its duty to consult and can justify the intrusion on 
title under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, para. 90, em-
phasis added). For an intrusion justification, the government must have a compelling and substantial 
objective, and the action must be consistent with the fiduciary obligations owed by the Crown. Chief 
Justice McLachlin emphasized that through this approach Aboriginal interests can be “reconciled” 
with broader societal interests (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, para. 82).
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implications of the Decision:
The Tsilhqot’in Nation decision is the first time that the Court has made a judicial declaration of 
Aboriginal title in Canada (Coates and Newman 2014, 5). However, while initial media coverage of 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision was quite dramatic, more sober analysis of the decision by Aboriginal 
law experts suggests that its impact is not as significant as some had initially suggested.4 The case re-
lied heavily on the seminal Aboriginal title decision of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia and related 
jurisprudence. Additionally, the facts in this case are quite particular in that it dealt with a claim of 
Aboriginal title in a remote area where there were no competing land claims. Finally, while the Court 
affirmed the obligations of the Crown when Aboriginal title has been established, it also emphasized 
that it remains open to the Crown to make a case for justifiable intrusion. In other words, Aboriginal 
title is not absolute. 
There are media and anecdotal reports that a host of First Na-
tions will now seek judicial declarations of Aboriginal title, along 
the lines of the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision. Indeed, it would be 
surprising if that were not the case (Coates and Newman 2014, 
6). However, the fact that many Aboriginal land claims are over-
lapping and that this case took five years to conclude at the trial 
level suggests that litigation may ultimately prove unattractive 
for many First Nations with outstanding land claims. The provin-
cial and federal governments instead favour negotiated settle-
ments of outstanding claims.  
The development of natural resources enterprises in provinces such as British Columbia that have 
a significant number of unresolved Aboriginal land claims is a complex issue. As the Court affirms in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation “[r]esource development on claimed land to which title has not been established 
requires the government to consult with the claimant Aboriginal group. Governments are under a 
legal duty to negotiate in good faith to resolve claims to ancestral lands” (para. 18). In situations of 
established Aboriginal title, consent is required – otherwise the Crown must discharge its duty to 
consult and be able to establish an intrusion justification, as discussed above. Some commentators 
have cautioned that this decision increases uncertainty for natural resource development projects in 
British Columbia, including existing enterprises (Bains 2014, 5–6).
4.3 Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (natural resources) (aboriginal treaty rights)
Citation:  Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48
Date:   July 11, 2014
appellant:  Andrew Keewatin Jr. and Joseph William Fobister, on their own behalf and on behalf 
of all other members of Grassy Narrows First Nation
respondent: Minister of Natural Resources, Resolute FP Canada Inc. (formerly Abitibi-Consolidated 
Inc.),  Attorney General of Canada and Goldcorp Inc.
and Between
appellant: Leslie Cameron, on his own behalf and on behalf of all other members of Wabauskang 
First Nation
respondent: Minister of Natural Resources, Resolute FP Canada Inc. (formerly Abitibi-Consolidated 
Inc.), Attorney General of Canada and Goldcorp Inc.
The provincial and 
federal governments 
favour negotiated 
settlements of 
outstanding claims 
over litigation.
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Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, and Wagner JJ.
issue: Whether Ontario has the power to “take up” lands in the Treaty 3 Keewatin area so as 
to limit harvesting rights, or whether Canada must approve.
Decision: Unanimous decision by McLachlin C.J.: Ontario has the power to “take up” lands un-
der Treaty 3. There is no requirement that Canada approve of such action.
Synopsis:
Unlike in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, discussed above, which dealt with an Aboriginal 
land claim, Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources) involves the interpretation 
of an Aboriginal treaty. Treaty 3 was signed in 1873 and involved the Ojibway Chiefs (from whom the 
Grassy Narrows First Nation are descendants) yielding ownership of territory, except for reserved 
lands. Part of the agreement involved the Ojibway having the right to harvest non-reserve lands until 
they were “taken up” for settlement or resource extraction. In 1912, these lands were annexed to On-
tario, which began issuing development licences with respect to them. This case began in 2005 when 
the Grassy Narrows First Nation sought to challenge a commercial logging licence issued by Ontario 
to a private company. The First Nation claimed that Canada would have to approve of such action. 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice McLachlin rejected the First Nation’s argument. She held 
that a proper interpretation of Treaty 3, the constitution, and relevant legislation found that Ontario, 
and only Ontario, had authority over whether non-reserve lands could be taken-up. However, she not-
ed that Ontario owed obligations that are well recognized in existing jurisprudence to the First Na-
tion. In particular, Ontario “must exercise its powers in conformity with the honour of the Crown, and 
is subject to the fiduciary duties that lie on the Crown in dealing with Aboriginal interests” (para. 50).
implications of the Decision:
Aboriginal law experts have said that this decision “is significant in the context of provincial own-
ership and jurisdiction over most natural resources” because it “strongly reaffirms the power of the 
provinces to operate within their spheres of constitutional jurisdiction, even when their activity must 
interact with Aboriginal communities (and as against claims to federal jurisdiction traditionally apply-
ing in that context)” (Coates and Newman 2014, 20). 
The case also provides clearer guidance to provincial governments on when they can authorize de-
velopment on non-reserve treaty lands, and how they must respect treaty rights in doing so. As Chief 
Justice McLachlin stated:
Where a province intends to take up lands for the purposes of a project within its 
jurisdiction, the Crown must inform itself of the impact the project will have on the 
exercise by the Ojibway of their rights to hunt, fish and trap, and communicate its 
findings to them. It must then deal with the Ojibway in good faith, and with the inten-
tion of substantially addressing their concerns. […] Not every taking up will consti-
tute an infringement of the harvesting rights set out in Treaty 3. This said, if the taking 
up leaves the Ojibway with no meaningful right to hunt, fish or trap in relation to the 
territories over which they traditionally hunted, fished, and trapped, a potential action 
for treaty infringement will arise. (para. 52)
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4.4 Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford (prostitution)
Citation:  Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72
Date:   December 20, 2013
appellant:  Attorney General of Canada/Attorney General of Ontario 
respondent: Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch, and Valerie Scott
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, 
and Wagner JJ.
issue: Whether three prostitution-related offences in the Criminal Code (section 210: the 
bawdy-house prohibition; section 212(1)(j): living on the avails of prostitution; and 
section 213(1)(c): communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution) infringe 
the Charter and, if so, are they saved under section 1 of the Charter?
Decision: Unanimous decision by McLachlin C.J.: each of the offences infringes section 7 of the 
Charter (principles of fundamental justice) and none are saved under section 1. The 
remedy was a one-year suspended declaration of invalidity, meaning that one year 
from the date of the decision, these offences would be of no force and effect.
Synopsis:5 
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a unanimous Court, found that the impugned offences engaged 
section 7 of the Charter (principles of fundamental justice) because “[t]he prohibitions at issue do 
not merely impose conditions on how prostitutes operate. They go a critical step further, by imposing 
dangerous conditions on prostitution; they prevent people engaged in a risky – but legal – activity 
from taking steps to protect themselves from the risks” (para. 60). Specifically, the Court found that 
the offences increased the risk to prostitutes because they prevent prostitutes from moving indoors, 
hiring bodyguards, and screening clients.
The Court made the following specific findings:
•	 The bawdy-house prohibition in section 210 of the Criminal Code: the Court held that the 
harms to street prostitutes were grossly disproportionate to the goal of deterring community 
disruption that the bawdy house prohibition pursues. 
•	 Living off the avails of prostitution in section 212(1)(j) of the Criminal Code: this offence 
was found to be overbroad because it criminalized some non-exploitative relationships (such 
as secretaries and body guards) that are not connected to the purpose of the law, which is to 
target pimps who engage in “parasitic, exploitative conduct” (para. 137). 
•	 Communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution in section 213(1)(c) of the Crim-
inal Code: this offence was found to be grossly disproportionate because “[t]he provision’s 
negative impact on the safety and lives of street prostitutes is a grossly disproportionate re-
sponse to the possibility of nuisance caused by street prostitution” (para. 159).
None of these offences were found to have been justified under section 1 of the Charter. The Court 
ordered a suspended declaration of invalidity for one year, meaning that by December 20, 2014, they 
would be struck down.
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implications of the Decision:
The Bedford decision means that unless Parliament responds with new legislation, Canada would 
have de facto legalized/decriminalized prostitution by December 20, 2014. Instead, the Government 
of Canada responded to the Bedford decision by introducing Bill C-36 (Protection of Communities 
and Exploited Persons Act), which would adopt a new approach to prostitution. Under this new 
approach, prostitution is recognized as inherently exploitative and the objective is to discourage 
prostitution and help prostitutes exit. While “johns”, “pimps,” and human traffickers are criminally 
liable under this legislation, prostitutes generally are not. Proponents of legalized/decriminalized 
prostitution have said they will raise a new Charter challenge against Bill C-36.6
The Chief Justice notes that “Parliament is not precluded from imposing limits on where and how 
prostitution may be conducted, as long as it does so in a way that does not infringe the constitutional 
rights of prostitutes” (para. 5). She added:
I have concluded that each of the challenged provisions, considered independently, 
suffers from constitutional infirmities that violate the Charter.  That does not mean 
that Parliament is precluded from imposing limits on where and how prostitution 
may be conducted.  Prohibitions on keeping a bawdy-house, living on the avails of 
prostitution and communication related to prostitution are intertwined.  They impact 
on each other.  Greater latitude in one measure – for example, permitting prostitutes 
to obtain the assistance of security personnel – might impact on the constitutionality 
of another measure – for example, forbidding the nuisances associated with keeping 
a bawdy-house.  The regulation of prostitution is a complex and delicate matter.   It 
will be for Parliament, should it choose to do so, to devise a new approach, reflecting 
different elements of the existing regime. (para. 165)
Advocates of legalized/decriminalized prostitu-
tion were quick to denounce Bill C-36 and have 
threatened a Charter challenge to it. For a further 
discussion and analysis of Bedford and the antic-
ipated Charter challenge, see Benjamin Perrin, 
2014, How to Make Canada’s New Prostitution 
Laws Work.
Prostitution is recognized as 
inherently exploitative and 
the objective is to discourage 
prostitution and help 
prostitutes exit.
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4.5 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6 (appointment of Supreme 
Court of Canada Justices from Quebec)
Citation:  Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21
Date:   March 21, 2014
appellant:  N/A (Reference by the Governor in Council)
respondent: N/A
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and Wagner JJ.
issue: The Government of Canada referred two questions to the Court about the eligibility 
of appointing judges to fill positions at the Court from Quebec. At issue was whether 
Justice Marc Nadon of the Federal Court of Appeal, formerly a lawyer in Quebec, met 
the eligibility requirements for elevation as a judge from Quebec to the Supreme 
Court of Canada and, if not, whether federal legislation could be amended to provide 
for his eligibility. 
Decision: Majority decision by McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and 
Wagner JJ.: Federal Court of Appeal judges are ineligible for appointment to the Su-
preme Court of Canada to fill any of the three positions reserved for Quebec. 
 Dissenting reasons by Moldaver J.: Current and former members of the Quebec Bar 
may be eligible for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Synopsis: 
The majority decision found that only current members of the Quebec Bar, the Quebec Court of Ap-
peal, or the Superior Court of Quebec could be appointed to fill any of the three positions reserved 
for Quebec on the Supreme Court of Canada. Former members of the Quebec Bar who were ap-
pointed to the Federal Court of Appeal are ineligible for elevation. The reasons given by the majority 
included a “plain meaning” of the relevant provisions of the Supreme Court Act, which was said to 
be consistent with the purpose of these provisions, namely to ensure that the bijuridical nature of 
Canada is reflected on the Court, as part of a historic compromise with Quebec. 
The majority decision also held that “Parliament cannot unilaterally change the composition of the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (para. 74). Such changes would require the unanimous consent of Parlia-
ment and all of the provinces.
The dissenting opinion argued that “[t]o suggest that Quebec wanted to render ineligible former 
advocates of at least 10 years standing at the Quebec bar is to rewrite history” (para. 147). Justice 
Moldaver suggested that the majority reasons could result in absurd situations:
A former Quebec superior court judge or advocate of 10 years standing at the Quebec 
bar could rejoin that bar for a day and thereby regain his or her eligibility for appoint-
ment to this Court.  In my view, this exposes the hollowness of the currency require-
ment.  Surely nothing is accomplished by what is essentially an administrative act.  Any 
interpretation of s. 6 [of the Supreme Court Act] that requires a former advocate of 
at least 10 years standing at the Quebec bar, or a former judge of the Quebec Court 
of Appeal or Superior Court, to rejoin the Quebec bar for a day in order to be eligible 
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for appointment to this Court makes no practical sense.  Respectfully, I find it difficult 
to believe that the people of Quebec would somehow have more confidence in this 
candidate on Friday than they had on Thursday. (para. 153)
implications of the Decision:
The majority reasons succinctly describe the immediate impact of their decision: “The practical effect 
is that the appointment of Justice Nadon and his swearing-in as a judge of the Court were void ab 
initio. He remains a supernumerary judge of the Federal Court of Appeal” (para. 6). Moving forward, 
only persons who are current members of the Quebec Bar for at least 10 years, judges on the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, or judges on the Superior Court of Quebec are eligible to fill the positions on the 
Supreme Court of Canada reserved for Quebec. 
The reference decision was portrayed in the media and by the 
federal Opposition parties as a major embarrassment to the 
Harper government who nominated Justice Nadon for elevation 
to the Supreme Court of Canada. The government released legal 
opinions that it had received prior to appointing Justice Nadon 
from two former Supreme Court of Canada judges that conclud-
ed he was eligible. The Court’s decision also led to an unprece-
dented public dispute involving Chief Justice McLachlin and the 
Prime Minister’s Office related to the circumstances of Justice 
Nadon’s appointment. 
The position left vacant after Justice Nadon was declared ineligible was subsequently filled by Justice 
Clément Gascon of the Quebec Court of Appeal after consultations between the federal and Quebec 
governments. Notably, Justice Gascon did not go through a Parliamentary committee process as have 
recent appointments. 
There are now questions about how future Supreme Court of Canada appointments will be managed. 
Minister Peter MacKay, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, has recently stated: “these 
appointments have always been a matter for the executive and continue to be. We will respect the 
confidentiality of the consultation process and will not comment on specific recommendations” (Fine 
24 September 2014).
A new controversy has also arisen with respect to Justice Robert Mainville who was sitting on the 
Federal Court of Appeal and was moved this summer to the Quebec Court of Appeal. There is spec-
ulation that this is a preliminary step to ensure that he would be eligible for appointment to one of 
the next openings on the Supreme Court of Canada for Quebec judges (on December 1, 2014) (Fine 
24 September 2014). Justice Mainville’s appointment to the Quebec Court of Appeal has been chal-
lenged by Toronto-lawyer Rocco Galati – the same lawyer who initially challenged Justice Nadon’s 
appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada. However, constitutional experts consider this latest 
challenge unlikely to succeed (Crawford 19 June 2014). If that is the case and Justice Mainville is ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court of Canada as a judge for Quebec, his move from the Federal Court of 
Appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal would have technically made him eligible under the terms of 
the majority reasons in the Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6. It could thus be one of the 
“end-runs” around the majority reasons of the type, although far less obvious, that Justice Moldaver 
alluded to in his dissenting reasons.  
Parliament cannot 
unilaterally change 
the composition of 
the Supreme Court 
of Canada.
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4.6 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat (security certificates 
and CSiS human sources)
Citation:  Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, 2014 SCC 37
Date:   May 15, 2014
appellant:  Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness
respondent: Mohamed Harkat
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and 
Wagner JJ.
issue: Whether the security certificate regime is constitutional. Whether the identities of 
CSIS human sources are protected by class privilege, and can they be cross-examined?
Decision: Majority decision by McLachlin C.J. (LeBel, Rothstein, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and Wag-
ner JJ. concurring): the security certificate regime is constitutional and the security 
certificate in this case is reasonable and upheld. While CSIS human sources are not 
protected by class privilege, there was no basis in this case to authorize the exception-
al interviewing or cross-examining of them.
 Joint reasons dissenting in part by Abella and Cromwell JJ.: CSIS human sources are 
protected by class privilege and should not be cross-examined.
Synopsis:
The security certificate regime in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that provides for 
the detention of foreign nationals who are inadmissible to Canada because of allegedly engaging in 
terrorism was found to be constitutionally deficient in a previous decision of the Court in Charkaoui 
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration). In response, Parliament amended the security certificate 
regime and it was challenged again in this decision in Harkat. The Court held that the amended 
security certificate regime was constitutional because it does not infringe Charter rights related to 
knowing and meeting the case against the named person, or the right to a decision based on facts and 
law. Special advocates in closed hearings can participate on behalf of the named person.
However, the majority opinion held that CSIS human sources are not protected by class privilege. The 
majority refused to apply police-informer privilege to CSIS human sources, partly on the basis of the 
differences between the policing and intelligence environments and the uses to which the informa-
tion is put. However, the majority notes: “If Parliament deems it desirable that CSIS human sources’ 
identities and related information be privileged, whether to facilitate coordination between police 
forces and CSIS or to encourage sources to come forward to CSIS . . . it can enact the appropriate 
protections” (para. 87). While CSIS human sources are not subject to class privilege, special advocates 
do not have unlimited access to interview or cross-examine them – this should only occur as a “last 
resort” in the discretion of the designated judge.
The partly dissenting decision in Harkat differed from the majority in that Justices Abella and Crom-
well would recognize that the identity of CSIS human sources should be protected by class privilege. 
A limited exception would apply in the security certificate context in very narrow circumstances and 
then only with disclosure to the special advocate. In such an instance, there should be no cross-ex-
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amination of the human source because “[r]equiring a human source to testify will have a profound 
chilling effect on the willingness of other sources to come forward, and will undoubtedly damage the 
relationship between CSIS and the source compelled to testify” (para. 138). 
implications of the Decision:
In upholding the amended security certificate regime that provides for the detention of foreign ter-
rorists, the Court has recognized that Parliamentary responses to its decisions will be given respect. 
This decision upholds an important national security tool and provides further guidance to designat-
ed judges in reviewing security certificate cases in future cases. 
For Harkat, the Court’s decision means the next stage (proceedings related to his removal from Cana-
da) will begin. No doubt, his case will be back at the Court as his counsel argues that he should not be 
sent back to his native Algeria due to concerns he could be tortured. In the meantime, he will remain 
in custody under the security certificate that has been upheld by the Court.  
However, the division on the Court in Harkat with respect to 
protecting the identity of CSIS human sources is stark and the 
majority decision denying such protection is concerning. As the 
dissenting judges recognize, such informants provide informa-
tion to CSIS at great risk to themselves. Such information may 
save many lives. It is difficult to understand why someone who 
anonymously calls Crimestoppers to report graffiti on a bus stop 
would be afforded greater legal protection than someone who 
tells CSIS confidentially about an impeding terrorist attack. As 
the dissenting judges also point out, national security informants 
were protected prior to the creation of CSIS when the now de-
funct RCMP Security Service dealt with such matters. The trans-
fer of those functions to CSIS should not be seen to erase that 
protection for intelligence sources, in their view.
On October 27, 2014, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness introduced Bill C-44 
(Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act) in the House of Commons. Included in the amendments 
proposed in Bill C-44 are provisions that would protect CSIS human sources with class privilege, 
subject to review by a Federal Court judge, with disclosure possible in certain instances. This would 
effectively overrule the majority decision in Harkat with respect to the confidentiality of CSIS human 
sources.
4.7 R. v. Hart; R. v. Mack (“Mr. Big” police operations)
Citation:  R. v. Hart, 2014 SCC 52; R. v. Mack, 2014 SCC 58
Date:   July 31, 2014 (Hart); September 26, 2014 (Mack) 
appellant:  Her Majesty the Queen (in Hart); Dax Richard Mack (in Mack)
respondent: Nelson Lloyd Hart (in Hart); Her Majesty the Queen (in Mack);
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and Wagner JJ. (in 
both cases)
issue: Whether statements by accused persons obtained through a “Mr. Big” undercover po-
lice operation are admissible as evidence.
This decision upholds 
an important 
national security 
tool and provides 
further guidance 
to judges reviewing 
security certificate 
cases in future cases.
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Decision: Hart: Majority decision by Moldaver J. (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, and Wagner 
JJ. concurring): statements by accused persons obtained by the Mr. Big technique are 
presumptively inadmissible, unless the Crown can show on a balance of probabilities 
that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effects. Such statements may also 
be excluded based on the abuse of process doctrine. On the facts, the majority would 
exclude the statements by the accused and leave it to the Crown prosecutor to decide 
how to proceed.
Concurring reasons (separate): Cromwell J. agreed with the framework set out 
by the majority but would have ordered a new trial where it could be applied.
Concurring reasons (separate): Karakatsanis J. agreed that the statements by 
the accused should be excluded, but based on the principle against self-in-
crimination in the Charter.
 Mack: Unanimous decision by Moldaver J.: the framework set out in Hart was applied 
to find that the Mr. Big statements were admissible on the facts of this case, such that 
the first-degree murder conviction was upheld.
Synopsis:
The “Mr. Big” technique involves undercover police officers posing as criminals to cultivate trust and 
a relationship with a target, who they suspect is involved in serious criminality. Over a period of time, 
the target may participate in a range of “scenarios” where they are led to believe they are participating 
in criminal conduct with the undercover officers (such as smuggling contraband goods). An aura of 
violence is often created, including simulated acts of violence involving the undercover officers. The 
operation culminates in a meeting with Mr. Big – the fictitious head of the criminal organization made 
up by the undercover officers. During that meeting the target is encouraged to admit to the criminal 
conduct that originally caused the police to be interested in the target. Statements made by the target 
are then used as evidence at trial against the accused. In some cases, there is corroborating evidence 
obtained as a result of the statements, such as accused persons leading the undercover police to the 
previously undiscovered body of the victim. 
The majority in Hart established a new common law rule of evidence to address concerns about reli-
ability, prejudice, and police misconduct that may arise from statements obtained through the Mr. Big 
technique. Such statements are presumptively inadmissible, unless the Crown prosecutor can show 
on a balance of probabilities that the statement’s probative value outweighs its prejudicial effects. 
Additionally, such statements may be excluded based on abuse of process. 
On the facts in Hart, the majority held that the Mr. Big statements should be excluded based on this 
new common law rule. They found that the accused was unemployed and socially isolated at the time 
the operation began and that he was given financial incentives and friendship by the undercover of-
ficers to participate in the Mr. Big scenarios. These provided an overwhelming incentive to confess to 
murdering his twin daughters, whether that was true or not. The confession was unreliable because 
it was inconsistent and there was no confirming evidence. The risk of prejudice in admitting them 
was also high (the jury would have disdain for the accused because he willingly participated in 63 
“scenarios” of a criminal nature). Accordingly, the probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial 
effects so the statements by the accused were excluded.
In Mack, a unanimous Court applied the framework established in Hart with the opposite outcome: 
Mack’s statements to the undercover officers in a Mr. Big operation were admissible and his first-de-
gree murder conviction was upheld.  The evidence showed that the probative value of the statements 
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Hart and Mack 
reflect a balanced 
and appropriate 
approach to the 
admissibility 
of statements 
obtained during a 
Mr. Big operation.
outweighed their prejudicial effects, there was no abuse of process, and the jury was adequately 
instructed on how to assess this evidence. Specifically, the accused in Mack had made confessions 
to two acquaintances prior to the Mr. Big operation commencing, and immediately after making a 
confession to an undercover officer in a Mr. Big operation the accused led them to a firepit where the 
victim’s remains were found. Additionally, shell casings from a gun found in the accused’s apartment 
matched shell casings found at the firepit. The operation did not involve the accused in any acts of 
violence or show him as being unsavory.  There was no improper conduct by the police officers. 
implications of the Decision:
Interestingly, the Mr. Big technique is considered to be a Canadian 
invention. The modern use of the Mr. Big technique began in the 
1990s and it had been used more than 350 times as of 2008 (R. v. 
Hart, para. 56). Despite concerns about the potential for wrongful 
convictions, the majority in Hart found that no such cases could 
be attributed to the Mr. Big technique (although the Kyle Unger 
prosecution involved a Mr. Big confession) (para. 62).
After the decision in Hart, the Crown prosecutors announced that 
they would not proceed with a further prosecution due to lack of 
evidence, since his statements under the Mr. Big technique were 
inadmissible. On the other hand, as mentioned above, in Mack, the 
Court upheld the first-degree murder conviction.
Taken together, Hart and Mack reflect a balanced and appropriate approach to the admissibility 
of statements by the accused obtained during a Mr. Big operation. The test set out by the Court for 
assessing these statements is coherent and relies on well-established evidentiary concepts such as 
probative value and prejudicial effects, helpfully particularized to this new situation. 
There was some concern after the release of Hart that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for 
Crown prosecutors to use Mr. Big operations in certain cases where they are vital to obtaining evi-
dence of serious criminality. However, the subsequent release of Mack shows that the technique re-
mains available in appropriate cases, and the Court has given some helpful guidance to investigators 
as to how they can design their Mr. Big operations in a way that addresses legitimate concerns about 
reliability, prejudice, and the potential for police misconduct. 
4.8 R. v. Spencer (request by police for basic subscriber information from 
iSP)
Citation:  R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43
Date:   June 13, 2014
appellant:  Matthew David Spencer
respondent: Her Majesty The Queen
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and 
Wagner JJ.
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issue: Whether the police can ask an Internet service provider (ISP) to voluntarily provide 
the name and address of a subscriber assigned to an Internet protocol (IP) address 
that was used to access and store child pornography, and use that information to ob-
tain a search warrant.
Decision: Unanimous decision by Cromwell J.: the police request for basic subscriber informa-
tion from the ISP was a search that infringed section 8 of the Charter. However, on the 
facts, the evidence was not excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
Synopsis:
The Court held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in linking the identity of a person 
to their Internet usage, such that the request by the police for information from the ISP amounted to 
a search under section 8 of the Charter. The request by police for the subscriber’s information had 
no lawful authority, meaning that the police could not compel the ISP to provide this information. 
Without the subscriber information, no warrant could have been obtained, so there was an unrea-
sonable search that violated the Charter. However, the Court found that the evidence obtained from 
the warrant should nevertheless be admissible on the facts of this case because its admission would 
not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) of the Charter because the 
police thought they were acting reasonably and lawfully and the offences were serious. Accordingly, 
the accused’s conviction for possession of child pornography was upheld and a new trial ordered on 
whether the accused was also guilty of making it available.  
implications of the Decision:
This is the first decision of the Supreme Court of Canada holding 
that if the police obtain basic subscriber information (name, address 
and telephone number) linked to an IP address, that this constitutes 
a search within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter. This rep-
resents a major development in how privacy on the Internet is con-
sidered in criminal matters, with privacy amounting to anonymity, 
and it departs from appellate decisions in several provinces (R. v. 
Spencer, para. 72). The police will be required to have a warrant to 
obtain such information in the future, absent exigent circumstances. 
The Director of Public Prosecution intervened in R. v. Spencer, argu-
ing that “recognizing a right to online anonymity would carve out a 
crime-friendly Internet landscape by impeding the effective investi-
gation and prosecution of online crime” (para. 49). Justice Cromwell 
responded to this concern by stating: 
However, in my view, recognizing that there may be a privacy interest in anonymity 
depending on the circumstances falls short of recognizing any ‘right’ to anonymity and 
does not threaten the effectiveness of law enforcement in relation to offences commit-
ted on the Internet. In this case, for example, it seems clear that the police had ample 
information to obtain a production order requiring Shaw to release the subscriber in-
formation corresponding to the IP address they had obtained. (para. 49, emphasis in 
original)
Accordingly, this decision will increase the workload of police investigating all manner of online 
criminal activity because they can generally no longer simply request voluntary disclosure of basic 
subscriber information from an ISP. However, the section 8 Charter jurisprudence includes some gen-
eral exceptions to warrantless searches based on exigent circumstances. 
The police will 
be required to 
have a warrant to 
obtain subscriber 
information 
in the future, 
absent exigent 
circumstances.
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The jurisprudence of the Court has long held that a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable 
and, in such an event, the Crown has the burden of demonstrating that “(a) it was authorized by law; 
(b) the law itself was reasonable; and (c) the search was carried out in a reasonable manner” (R. v. 
Spencer, para. 68 relying on R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 at 278). 
The decision in R. v. Spencer was released after the tabling of Bill C-13 (Protecting Canadians from 
Online Crime Act) in the House of Commons on November 20, 2013, related to “cyber-bullying” and 
other online criminal law issues. Some commentators have argued that Bill C-13 (clause 20) needs to 
be examined and potentially amended in light of the decision in R. v. Spencer as it includes a provision 
related to voluntary requests by law enforcement authorities for data. However, Minister MacKay has 
indicated there is no intention to do so.
4.9 R. v. Summers (Truth in Sentencing Act)
Citation:  R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 267
Date:   April 11, 2014
appellant:  Her Majesty The Queen 
respondent: Sean Summers 
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel,  Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Wagner JJ.
issue: Whether ineligibility for early release and parole while on remand is a “circumstance” 
that can justify granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody under the Truth in 
Sentencing Act.
Decision: Unanimous decision by Karakatsanis J.: The loss of access to parole and early release 
justifies enhanced pre-sentence credit at a ratio of 1.5 to 1
Synopsis:
This case interpreted changes made by the Truth in Sentencing Act (2009) to the rules related to 
credit for pre-sentence detention. Prior to these changes, courts typically awarded 2 for 1 credit (or 3 
for 1 in some cases) for pre-sentence custody because the rules for parole eligibility and early release 
fail to account for pre-sentence detention, such that an offender would have a different statutory re-
lease date depending on whether he or she was denied bail or not. Additionally, conditions in pre-trial 
detention are often harsher than in corrections facilities (R. v. Summers, paras. 2–3).
Under the new rules in the Truth in Sentencing Act, section 719(3) of the Criminal Code provides 
for “a maximum of one day [credit] for each day spent in custody”. However, section 719(3.1) states 
that “if the circumstances justify it, the maximum is one and one-half days for each day spent in cus-
tody”. In Summers, the Court noted that the aim of the Truth in Sentencing Act was “to remove any 
incentive for an accused to drag out time in remand custody, and to provide transparency so that the 
public would know what the fit sentence was, how much credit had been given, and why” (para. 4). 
Justice Karakatsanis found that under these new rules, credit for pre-sentence custody is capped at a 
maximum ratio of 1.5 to 1. Her reasons interpret when this “enhanced credit” (rather than the default 
1 to 1 credit) should be awarded. For a unanimous Court, she concluded that enhanced credit should 
be given if failing to do so would negatively affect early release (even if the pre-sentence detention 
was not harsh, and the offender was unlikely to be granted parole). However, she stated that “a lower 
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rate may be appropriate when detention was a result of the offender’s bad conduct, or the offender 
is likely to obtain neither early release nor parole” (para. 71).
Justice Karakatsanis also raised particular concerns about Aboriginal offenders, who are statistically 
more likely to be denied bail, stating “[a] system that results in consistently longer, harsher sentences 
for vulnerable members of society, not based on the wrongfulness of their conduct but because of 
their isolation and inability to pay, can hardly be said to be assigning sentences in line with the prin-
ciples of parity and proportionality” (para. 67).
implications of the Decision:
The decision in Summers found that the Truth in Sentencing Act capped credit for pre-sentence 
custody at a ratio of 1.5 to 1, citing clear evidence of Parliamentary intention on that point. It did not 
find such a clear intention, however, with respect to when this enhanced credit should be awarded, 
and it interpreted such circumstances broadly to include most cases. The outcome is a loss for the 
government, although it was successful in reducing the typical pre-sentence credit down from 2:1 to 
1.5:1 in most cases.
4.10 Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling (retrospective repeal of 
accelerated parole review)
Citation:  Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, 2014 SCC 20
Date:   March 20, 2014
appellant:  Attorney General of Canada
respondents: Christopher John Whaling; Judith Lynn Slobbe; Cesar Maidana
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and 
Wagner JJ.
issue: Whether section 10(1) of the Abolition of Early Parole Act, which made the abolition 
of accelerated parole review apply retrospectively to offenders already serving their 
sentences, infringed section 11(h) of the Charter (double jeopardy). If yes, is it saved 
by section 1 of the Charter?
Decision: Unanimous decision by Wagner J.: section 10(1) of the Abolition of Early Parole Act 
infringed section 11(h) of the Charter and is not saved by section 1 of the Charter. 
Accordingly, section 10(1) was declared invalid.
Synopsis:
The Abolition of Early Parole Act ended the ability of first-time, non-violent offenders to be granted 
accelerated parole review (APR). In Whaling, Justice Wagner for a unanimous Court noted that there 
had been criticism of APR since its inception in 1992 (paras. 3–6). By 1997, APR allowed for day parole 
to be granted after six months, or one-sixth, of the offender’s sentence had been served (whichever 
was longer), instead of the offender having to wait to apply for day parole six months before their 
eligibility for full parole. The Correctional Service of Canada Review Panel reported in 2007 that APRs 
“undermined discretionary release and generally have not proved as effective as discretionary release 
in mitigating violent reoffending” (Whaling, para. 6). In 2011, the Abolition of Early Parole Act ended 
APR. However, section 10(1) of this legislation purported to make this apply retrospectively to offend-
ers already serving their sentences. 
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Section 11(h) of the Charter establishes a right not to be punished twice for the same offence. 
Justice Wagner concluded that section 10(1) of the Abolition of Early Parole Act violated this 
right and could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter, so he declared it invalid. He held:
Parliament based its decision to abolish APR on considerable evidence, present-
ed by the Crown in this case, that the system was not working effectively. It 
was within Parliament’s prerogative to pass legislation it thought necessary to 
improve the system. . . . Uniformity of parole administration may be a worthy 
objective, but the Crown has failed to provide compelling evidence that that 
uniformity would be impaired if the APR system continued to apply to offend-
ers who were sentenced under it. . . . In my view, having the repeal apply only 
prospectively was an alternative means available to Parliament that would have 
enabled it to attain the objectives of reforming parole administration and main-
taining confidence in the justice system without violating the s. 11 (h) rights of 
offenders who had already been sentenced. (paras. 78–80)
implications of the Decision:
The decision in Whaling represents an important caution to Parliament about adopting retro-
spective sentencing-related measures. The Court rightly identified section 10(1) of the Abolition 
of Early Parole Act as problematic because it significantly changed the rules for eligibility for day 
parole after an offender had already been sentenced – the legislation was not merely administra-
tive in nature, but had real consequences for offenders already serving terms of imprisonment. 
However, the practical impact of Whaling on the Abolition of Early Parole Act moving forward 
is nil because APR is abolished for all offenders sentenced after this legislation came into force. 
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5. Conclusion
This study has found that during the last year, the Supreme Court of Canada has made landmark de-
cisions having significant implications for law and policy across many areas. It has done so usually 
based on consensus, as just two cases among the top 10 most significant decisions have dissenting 
reasons. The Court has also ruled almost entirely against the federal government, with a single clear 
win among these most significant decisions. 
One would be hard pressed to find another actor in Canada who has had a greater impact on such 
a wide range of issues than the Court has in the last year, such that the moniker “Policy-Maker of the 
Year” is appropriate. The Court, no doubt, would resist such a label on the view that it simply applies 
the law. The Court has a constitutionally vital role both in interpreting and applying the law as well as 
providing constitutional scrutiny to laws and governmental action. However, as this study has shown, 
it would be naïve and simplistic to say that the Court’s decisions do not have a significant legal and 
policy impact. Indeed, the outcomes and implications of the Court’s decisions of the last year are no-
table across a number of areas and will likely be of enduring significance. 
If the norm becomes a united Court handing down losses to the federal government, there is a risk of 
increasing tensions and frustrations by the federal government where the Supreme Court of Canada 
is viewed as an impediment to legal and policy reforms – this would not be healthy for our democracy 
or the proper functioning of either body. Notably, not all of the decisions where the federal govern-
ment has suffered losses are attributable to constitutional considerations. Several, in fact, reflect losses 
based on judicial interpretations of federal legislation – areas that are amenable to legislative reform. 
Given that the Government of Canada has proposed legislation to respond to several of the decisions 
that it has lost (notably in Bedford and Harkat), subsequent litigation related to this new legislation, if 
adopted, would be a very telling test for whether Parliament and the Court are able to reach a degree 
of reconciliation, as they have on other controversial issues in the past, or not. More high-profile con-
troversial issues such as euthanasia, polygamy, the “right to strike”, the fate of long-gun registry data 
from Quebec, and the constitutionality of a raft of new justice and immigration laws are also destined 
for decision by the Court in the coming months and years. In other words, time will tell whether Can-
ada has entered a “legal cold war” (Ling 7 August 2014) or if this has merely been a long, cold winter 
for the federal government. 
author’s note
I am grateful to David Watson and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback and sugges-
tions.
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Endnotes
1 Copies of these decisions can be downloaded via Lexum, Judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Canada: http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/en/nav.do.
2 The result is listed as mixed because the Court ruled that statements obtained by accused persons 
in Mr. Big operations may be admissible, depending on the facts. In R. v. Hart, 2014 SCC 52, the 
statements were inadmissible, whereas in R. v. Mack, 2014 SCC 58 they were admissible.
3 Bill C-36, see Benjamin Perrin, 2014, How to Make Canada’s New Prostitution Laws Work  at 6-7.
4 See Ken Coates and Dwight Newman, 2014, The End is Not Nigh: Reason over Alarmism in Ana-
lysing the Tsilhqot’in Decision.
5 This synopsis is taken from Benjamin Perrin, 2014, How to Make Canada’s New Prostitution 
Laws Work.
6 For further discussion of Bill C-36, see Benjamin Perrin, 2014, How to Make Canada’s New Pros-
titution Laws Work.
7 See also R. v. Carvery, 2014 SCC 27; R. v. Clarke, 2014 SCC 28.
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What people are saying 
about the Macdonald-
Laurier institute
I commend Brian Crowley and the team 
at MLI for your laudable work as one 
of the leading policy think tanks in our 
nation’s capital. The Institute has distin-
guished itself as a thoughtful, empirical-
ly-based and non-partisan contributor to 
our national public discourse.
PRIME MINISTER STEPHEN HARPER
As the author Brian Lee Crowley has set 
out, there is a strong argument that the 
21st Century could well be the Canadian 
Century.
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON
In the global think tank world, MLI has 
emerged quite suddenly as the “disrup-
tive” innovator, achieving a well-deserved 
profile in mere months that most of the 
established players in the field can only 
envy. In a medium where timely, relevant, 
and provocative commentary defines val-
ue, MLI has already set the bar for think 
tanks in Canada.
PETER NICHOLSON, FORMER SENIOR POLICY ADVI-
SOR TO PRIME MINISTER PAUL MARTIN
I saw your paper on Senate reform [Be-
yond Scandal and Patronage] and liked 
it very much. It was a remarkable and 
coherent insight – so lacking in this parti-
san and anger-driven, data-free, ahistorical 
debate – and very welcome.
SENATOR HUGH SEGAL, NOVEMBER 25, 2013
Very much enjoyed your presentation 
this morning. It was first-rate and an 
excellent way of presenting the options 
which Canada faces during this period of 
“choice”... Best regards and keep up the 
good work.
PRESTON MANNING, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 
MANNING CENTRE FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY
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